Tuz v. Chadbourne, Inc., 310 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1975) by Holmes, T. Elaine
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 4 Article 5
Fall 1975
Tuz v. Chadbourne, Inc., 310 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1975)
T. Elaine Holmes
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
T. Elaine Holmes, Tuz v. Chadbourne, Inc., 310 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1975), 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 660 (2014) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol3/iss4/5
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Judgments-IssuE PRECLUSION-FORMAL ADVERSENESS BETWEEN CO-
DEFENDANTS Is NOT PREREQUISITE TO APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL BY JUDG-
MENT; SINGLE ACCIDENT INJURING MORE THAN ONE PERSON MAY
PRODUCE SINGLE ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.-Tuz
v. Chadbourne, Inc., 310 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1975).
While driving down a dead-end street Samuel M. Tuz collided with
a road grader owned by Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. Tuz was injured
and his passenger was killed. The passenger's widow brought suit
against Tuz and Chadbourne in the Escambia County Court of Record
for the wrongful death of her husband. A verdict of $126,000 was
rendered against the defendants. Both defendants appealed. In Tuz
v. Burmeister," the First District Court of Appeal reversed in part,
stating that as a matter of law Chadbourne could not have been ex-
pected "to anticipate ... that the death of the decedent would probably
have occurred as a result of parking the roadgrading equipment on
the edge of a dead-end street. ' ' 2
Defendant Tuz subsequently became plaintiff Tuz in a suit against
Chadbourne to recover for personal injuries. He claimed that Chad-
bourne had been negligent in leaving the grader unattended and un-
lighted. The trial court granted defendant Chadbourne summary
judgment. The court reasoned that Tuz was estopped from raising the
issue of Chadbourne's negligence by the finding on that issue rendered
by the appellate court in Burmeister. The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed.' It agreed with the lower court that the issue of Chadbourne's
negligence had already been fully explored by both parties and de-
termined in Burmeister.4 The appellate court noted: "It was strenuous-
ly contended in that prior suit [Burmeister] that Tuz was not guilty of
gross negligence and that the cause of the collision was the negligence
of Chadbourne."5
The Supreme Court of Florida then granted certiorari6 based on
alleged conflict with Youngblood v. Taylor.7 Finding no conflict be-
tween Tuz and Youngblood, the court subsequently discharged the
writ of certiorari as improvidently issued and rendered an opinion
effectively adopting the lower court's reasoning.8 The court dis-
1. 254 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
2. Id. at 571-72.
3. Tuz v. Chadbourne, Inc., 290 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
4. Id. at 548-49.
5. Id. at 548.
6. No. 45,216 (Fla. July 12, 1974).
7. 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956).
8. Tuz v. Chadbourne, Inc., 310 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1975).
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tinguished Tuz from Youngblood by finding that the parties and issues
in Tuz were identical with those in Burmeister.' Estoppel by judgment
was therefore applied. The doctrine did not apply in Youngblood be-
cause the parties in the first suit were different from those in the sub-
sequent suit.'
The holdings of the lower courts, culminating in the supreme
court's approval, subtly altered the elements of estoppel by judgment.
Tuz implies that estoppel by judgment is applicable to parties who did
not formally oppose each other in a former suit," and that injury of
more than one party does not necessarily result in more than one
issue.' 2 The holding alters Florida civil procedure by imposing the
equivalent of a mandatory cross-claim rule on certain codefendants. 13
Estoppel by judgment 1 is an aspect of res judicata that prevents
litigation of issues already adjudicated between the same parties in a
different cause of action.'5 Florida courts use the term res judicata
only when discussing bar and merger. Estoppel by judgment is treated
as a distinct concept. The difference between the terms is expressed in
Gordon v. Gordon:'6
[U]nder res adjudicata a final decree or judgment bars a subse-
quent suit between the same parties based upon the same cause of
action and is conclusive as to all matters germane thereto that were
or could have been raised, while the principle of estoppel by judg-
ment is applicable where the two causes of action are different,
in which case the judgment in the first suit only estops the parties
from litigating in the second suit issues-that is to say points and
questions-common to both causes of action and which were actually
adjudicated in the prior litigation. 17
9. See pages 662-63 infra.
10. See id.
11. Under the traditional view of estoppel by judgment, the doctrine is applicable
only if the parties involved in the later litigation were formal adversaries in the initial
litigation. See note 21 infra.
12. See pages 665-69 infra.
13. See notes 53-58 and accompanying text infra.
14. A victim of varying terminology, the concept of estoppel by judgment has been
applied under the aliases "issue preclusion," "collateral estoppel," "estoppel by record,"
and "estoppel by verdict." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45, Comment on
Clause (c) at 21-22. (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of
Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REv. 217 (1954).
15. Field v. Field, 68 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. 1953); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40, 43
(Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952); Epps v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 40 So. 2d
131 (Fla. 1949); Hohweiler v. Hohweiler, 167 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942).
16. 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
17. Id. at 44. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT OF
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Traditionally, the following three requirements must be satisfied
before estoppel by judgment applies: (1) the initial litigation must
result in a final judgment on the merits; 8 (2) the issue decided in the
initial litigation must be identical to the issue presented in the later
action; 19 and (3) the parties to the later suit must be the same parties,
litigating in the same capacities, as those in the prior suit, or be in
privity with such parties. 20 The third requirement has usually been
interpreted to require that parties in the later suit were formal ad-
versaries in the first suit.21 The doctrine of estoppel by judgment is
founded on the proposition that it is in the interest of the parties and
the state to settle every justiciable controversy in one action and there-
by avoid interminable litigation.22
The supreme court granted certiorari in Tuz based on alleged con-
flict with Youngblood. In Youngblood a father brought suit on his
own behalf for damages that he sustained as a result of his son's in-
juries. The father, suing as next friend of his son, had lost a prior ac-
tion against the same defendant. The Florida Supreme Court held
that neither res judicata nor estoppel by judgment applied because
the adversaries were different in each suit. Because the father's legal
capacity as his son's next friend differed from the father's own legal
identity, the court held that the parties to the two suits were not
JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, Introductory Note (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942).
18. Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
19. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 498 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1974);
Shearn v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., 88 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1956); McGregor v. Provident
Trust Co., 162 So. 323, 329 (Fla. 1935); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature
of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 164.
20. Ford v. Dania Lumber & Supply Co., 7 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1942); McGregor v.
Provident Trust Co., 162 So. 323 (Fla. 1935); Martin v. Arrow Cabs, Inc., 107 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
21. Though worded in terms of res judicata, RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942)
applies to estoppel by judgment. See id., ch. 3, Introductory Note, at 160-61. Section 82
states:
The rendition of a judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the
action who are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se
upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, be-
tween themselves.
Illustration 1 of § 82 supports Tuz' action against Chadbourne:
A and B are driving automobiles, which collide. C, a passenger in B's car, sues
A and B. Whether the judgment is in favor of or against C as to either or both
A and B, the issues as to negligence or other element of the cause of action are not
res judicata in a subsequent action by A against B for damage to his car.
See id. § 106, comment c at 506-07. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82 &
Reporter's Note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); note 36 infra.
22. Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952); RE-
STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 1, comment a (1942); Note, Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV. 818, 841 (1952).
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identical. Therefore the third requirement for the application of es-
toppel by judgment was not met.
Tuz presented a factual situation akin to Youngblood. Neither
Youngblood nor Tuz sought to recover for his own injuries in the
initial action; neither had formally opposed the defendant prior to
the second suit. Moreover, the Youngblood court had stated in dicta:
[I]f two persons wholly unrelated are passengers in a motorcar
that becomes involved in an accident, only one set of circumstances
arises as a basis for recovery. But it does not follow that there is but
one cause of action[,] for each of the injured persons has the right
to sue and the action of one is not determined by the adjudication
of the action of the other.23
The supreme court distinguished the two cases, stressing that in
Tuz, unlike Youngblood, identical parties had participated in both
suits.2 4 The Tuz court asserted that the Youngblood dicta remains good
law "so long as the person was not a party to an earlier action that in-
volved points and questions common to both causes of action and
which were actually adjudicated. '" 2 5
Tuz was a party to the initial suit, but did not file a formal cross-
claim. Since he was not formally adverse to his codefendant in the
initial suit, and was not in privity with the plaintiff,26 collateral estoppel
could not be invoked against him under the traditional interpretation
of the party identity requirement. 27 The supreme court's extremely
broad language in Tuz indicates that identity of parties may be found
whenever parties to the later suit were parties to the initial suit-even
if those parties were not formal adversaries in the first action.
With Tuz, Florida joins those jurisdictions that, in certain situa-
tions, do not treat adverse pleadings between codefendants in the
initial suit as a prerequisite to application of estoppel by judgment in
subsequent litigation between those parties. Jurisdictions that recognize
an exception to the formal adverseness requirement do not agree on
the proper scope of the exception. Exceptions recognized by various
jurisdictions, set forth in order of increasing breadth, are: (1) plaintiff
23. 89 So. 2d at 505 (emphasis added).
24. 310 So. 2d at 10.
25. Id.
26. Osburn v. Stickel, 187 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (no privity exists
between a passenger and his driver).
_ 27. See 310 So. 2d at 11-12 (Ervin, J., dissenting); note 21 supra.
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seeking indemnity28 or contribution2 9 from a former codefendant; (2)
plaintiff suing former codefendant where an element necessary for his
recovery was actually or necessarily litigated by the plaintiff;30 and (3)
plaintiff suing former codefendant where both had full opportunity
and incentive to oppose each other in the prior suit but failed to do
so.
3  The Tuz language goes beyond these exceptions, however, by
28. E.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Ct.
App. 1969); Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louisville & N.R.R., 179 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944);
Miraglia v. Miraglia, 255 A.2d 762 (N.J. Ct. App. 1969). See Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 106 (1942); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata
Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REv. 27, 32-33 (1964); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 318 (1969). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82, Reporter's Note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1975); notes 30-31 infra.
29. E.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); Berry v. City of Santa Barbara, 56 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 1967); Colon v.
Automatic Retailers Ass'n Service, Inc., 343 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Civ. Ct. 1972). See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 106 (1942); Annot., supra note 28; Vestal, supra note 28. See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82, Reporter's Note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975); notes 30-31 infra.
30. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Federal Express, 136 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1943); Flagstaff v.
Walsh, 9 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 695 (1926); Nickert v. Puget
Sound Tug & Barge Co., 335 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Mobile v. George, 45
So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1950); Creeco Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 219 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. Ct. App.
1966); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Post & McCord, Inc., 36 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1941). This situation frequently arises in the context of contributory negligence. For
example, in Franciscy v. Jordan, 193 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), a guest passenger
injured in an accident had sued the drivers of the two vehicles involved. One driver was
found negligent, the other was not. In a second suit, the negligent driver's administrator
attempted to sue the administrator of the other driver. The court held that he was
estopped by the prior action. The court reasoned that to prosecute the second action
successfully the administrator would have to allege that the driver had not been
contributorily negligent, an issue that had been asserted unsuccessfully in the prior suit.
Actual litigation of an issue underlies the exception for contribution and indemnity
actions. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 106, comments b-c (1942). The drafters of the
first Restatement were reluctant to extend this rationale to other situations. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82, Reporter's Note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
Similarly, Minnesota has applied collateral estoppel in suits for contribution from a
former codefendant, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 5 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1942),
but refused to foreclose relitigation of negligence where one codefendant brings an action
to recover for his own injuries, Bunge v. Yager, 52 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1952). In the
latter situation, the Bunge court held, codefendants must have been formally adverse
in the initial action for collateral estoppel to apply.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975), see note 36
infra, substantially expands the "actual litigation" exception to the adversity require-
ment. For discussion of factors that determine whether an issue has actually been
litigated, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §68, comments d-f (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973). For exceptions to the general rule of § 68, see id. § 68.1.
31. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 246 N.E.2d 725 (N.Y. 1969). See Livesay Indus. v.
Livcsay Window Co., 202 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1953); Boston & M.R.R. v. Sargent, 57
A. 688, 690 (N.H. 1904); Lloyd v. Barr, 11 Pa. 41, 52 (1849); Vestal, supra note 28, at 32-33.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942), see note 21 supra, indicates adversity between
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suggesting that mere participation in a prior suit involving identical
issues subjects a party to estoppel by judgment. Consequently, a former
codefendant could be estopped from litigating an issue on the basis of
a judgment in a prior proceeding that gave him no real opportunity
to contest that issue 2 This would violate procedural due process. 3
The supreme court probably did not intend so broad a reading, al-
though the language permits it. By joining Tuz and Chadbourne as
codefendants, Burmeister's widow may have intended to force them
to fight out between themselves the issue of whose negligence caused
the passenger's death. In the initial suit, the extent of each codefendant's
liability turned on the amount of blame each could cast upon the
other. Because the codefendants may have been compelled to introduce
all relevant evidence of negligence, they may have behaved adversely
without filing cross-claims. Actual adversity-irrespective of formal
pleadings-was probably the unspoken basis for the Tuz decision.34 If
so, Florida goes no further in this area than some other jurisdictions35
or the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.s5
The Tuz decision also helps to clarify the second requirement for
the application of estoppel by judgment-identity of issue. Two pairs
of Florida cases have followed opposed rationales in determining
whether this requirement has been met. The first pair of cases holds
that the number of issues can never be less than the number of injured
codefendants in the initial suit is not required for application of collateral estoppel to
issues those codefendants actually litigated or had an opportunity to litigate. But the
Restatement viewed "opportunity" narrowly. See id., comments a-d; id. § 106, comment
d; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82, Reporter's Note at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1975). Cf. id. § 88.
32. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment e at 152 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973):
Sometimes the party against whom preclusion is asserted is covered by an
insurance policy and represented by insurance company counsel in the prior action
but not in the subsequent action. In such instances, preclusion with respect to
unlitigated issues seems particularly unfair.
33. Courts have often suggested that binding a person through the judgment in
an action that gave him no opportunity to have his claim heard denies due process. E.g.,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 17 (1907). However, estoppel of such persons may in certain situations be
consistent with a flexible approach to due process. See Note, Collateral Estoppel of
Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1496-1504 (1974).
34. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
35. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) states:
Parties who are not adversaries to each other under the pleadings in an action
involving them and a third party are bound by and entitled to the benefits of
issue preclusion with respect to issues they actually litigate as adversaries to each
other and which are essential to the judgment rendered.
1975]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
parties. The cases rely on the Youngblood statement37 that suit by one
party can never foreclose the subsequent suit of another party injured
in the same accident. In Culloden v. Music s the two minor sons of
Music had been killed in the same accident. He first brought success-
ful wrongful death and survival actions as father and administrator of
one son. He then filed wrongful death and survival actions based on
the death of the other son and won a judgment in the trial court on
the theory that "the defendant was estopped to deny liabili-
ty because of the judgment against defendant in the prior ac-
tion . . . ."9 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court. Though it found the parties to the two suits were identical ,40
37. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
38. 226 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), overruled, Seaboard Coastline R.R.
v. Cox, 308 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Even though Culloden was over-
ruled in the second district, it remains sound law in the first district as adopted in
Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. Arnett, 303 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974). However,
noting the conflict between the first and second districts, the Florida Supreme Court
has granted conflict certiorari in Cox. See note 48 infra.
39. 226 So. 2d at 240-41.
40. In Colonial Enterprises v. Hill, 227 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1969), the supreme court
had adopted the view that an individual is a party to two suits, despite formal assump-
tion of different capacities in those suits, if he is the real party in interest in all
litigation. Thus, a widow who lost an action for the wrongful death of her husband
was estopped from relitigating defendant's negligence in a survival action brought as
administratrix of his estate. Epps v. Railway Express Agency, 40 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1949).
But a husband's unsuccessful suit for the wrongful death of his wife did not estop his
daughter, acting as her mother's personal representative, from relitigating the issue of
defendant's negligence in a survival action. Colonial Enterprises v. Hill, supra.
The Culloden court reasoned that because both sons of the plaintiff had died, he
was the real party in interest in both suits. The court rejected defendant's claim that
Youngblood compelled a finding that the parties to the suits in Culloden were not
identical. Noting that in Youngblood the son had not died, the court stated:
If the injuries of the minor son in Youngblood had resulted in death, then any
benefits inuring would have gone to the father, not to his injured son, and the
father would then have been the real party in interest in both instances and
having lost one case would be barred from recovery in the other ...
In the causes of action prosecuted in the prior suit for the death of Chester
Music, there is no question that Amos Music, as father and plaintiff was the
real party in interest in both his suit for the wrongful death of his minor son
Chester and his suit as administrator of Chester's estate ...
In the causes of action prosecuted herein for the death of Roger Music, there
is likewise no question that Amos Music is the real party in interest in both his
suit for the wrongful death of his other minor son Roger and his suit as ad-
ministrator of Roger's estate ...
It is not contested that Kenneth Culloden . . . was the defendant in both the
prior and instant suits.
Therefore, the parties are identical both in the prior and in the instant actions
for the purpose of the application of the doctrine of res adjudicata.
226 So. 2d at 242-43 (citations omitted).
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it held that the defendant was not collaterally estopped from relitigat-
ing the negligence issue. The district court, relying on the Youngblood
dicta, reasoned that the deaths of different persons necessarily raised
separate issues.41
A similar result was reached by the First District Court of Appeal
in Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. Arnett.42 The court there held that col-
lateral estoppel did not apply where a father sought to recover in sepa-
rate suits for the deaths of two of his children killed in the same col-
lision. Although the father failed to recover against the railroad in the
suit for his daughter's death, he was not estopped from relitigating the
negligence issue in the suit for his son's death. The court justified this
result by following Culloden. It stated: "No matter how similar the
points of law and questions may be, the points and questions herein
revolve around the death of Paul Joe Arnett, the minor child of the
plaintiff, and not of Carol Arnett, who was the other minor child lost
in [the] collision.."43
The second pair of cases holds by implication that multiple injuries
do not necessarily result in more than one justiciable issue. In Shearn
v. Orlando Funeral Home, Inc.,44 decided the same year as Youngblood,
plaintiff first sued successfully for the pain and suffering of the deceased.
Plaintiff then instituted a suit to recover for her own injuries. Res
judicata was held not to apply since the causes of action were different
in each suit.45 But collateral estoppel did apply against the defendant
because, the supreme court said, the parties were the same in both
suits46 and the pleadings raised no negligence issue that had not been
determined in the prior suit.
In each of the cases.., the allegation of the complaint as to liability
of the defendant is the same, viz.: that the driver of defendant's am-
bulance 'negligently and carelessly drove said ambulance of the
Orlando Funeral Home, Inc., into and against the automobile.'4 7
Although the Shearn court did not explicitly examine the question, by
implication it rejected the view that every injury gives rise to a
separate issue. For estoppel by judgment to apply all three require-
ments must be satisfied, including that of identity of issue. Since the
Shearn court applied that doctrine even though each suit involved an
41. 226 So. 2d at 244.
42. 303 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
43. Id. at 653-54.
44. 88 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1956).
45. Id. at 594.
46. Id. Cf. note 40 supra.
47. 88 So. 2d at 594.
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injury to a different person, the court must have been satisfied that
the requirement was met.
In Seoboard Coastline R.R. v. Coxj5 the plaintiff had previously
brought a successful suit against the railroad for the wrongful death
of his mother. He then sued the railroad for the wrongful death of
his father, who was killed in the same collision that killed his mother.
The Second District Court of Appeal applied estoppel by judgment
to preclude the railroad from further litigating the issue of its
negligence. The court rejected Culloden on the ground that it directly
conflicted with Shearn. The Cox court stated that "the negligence of
the defendant which was an issue in the second suit had already been
adjudicated in the first suit."4 9
Although it did not mention Shearn or Cox,50 the Tuz court im-
plicitly adopted the rationale of those cases. The Shearn and Cox courts
found that the initial suit settled the issue of defendant's negligence
toward all victims of a single accident. The Culloden and Arnett courts,
by contrast, took the view that the initial suit settled only the issue
of a defendant's negligence toward a specific accident victim. In Tuz,
the initial litigation produced a narrow holding; the district court de-
termined only that Chadbourne had not breached a duty to Tuz's
passenger.51 Nonetheless, the supreme court treated that litigation as
resolving the issue of Chadbourne's negligence toward another victim
of the accident-Tuz. The supreme court stated that "the issue of
respondent Chadbourne's negligence, having been litigated and deter-
mined in a prior case [need] not be litigated again . ,,52 The court
48. 308 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. granted, No. 47,137 (Fla., July 7,
1975). The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflict between Arnett
and Cox.
49. 308 So. 2d at 156. Cox is similar in one respect to Seaboard Coastline R.R. v.
Arnett, 303 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), see notes 42-43 and accompanying
text supra. Though Cox and Arnett rest on different legal theories, in each case the
court applied collateral estoppel to the detriment of the railroad.
Until 1967, a statutory presumption operated against railroads in negligence cases.
Though that statute has been declared Unconstitutional, Florida East Coast Ry. v. Ed-
wards, 197 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1967), it remains on the books, FLA. STAT. § 768.05 (1973).
50. The supreme court discharged the writ of certiorari in Tuz on February 12, 1975,
the same day Cox was decided by the Second District Court of Appeal.
51. The Burmeister court stated:
In the present cause, even if it could be said that Chadbourne, Inc. was negligent
in parking its heavy equipment upon the edge of a dead-end street, under the
circumstances as shown by the evidence, it appears without dispute that the
negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the decedent's death.
254 So. 2d at 571 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 2 supra.
52. 310 So. 2d at 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment c at 147
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973), indicates that a broad reading of "issue" is a necessary con-
sequence of loosening the formal adversity requirement in new causes of action involving
different plaintiffs.
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thus seems to have adopted the Shearn and Cox view that the issue in
the initial suit is who caused a specific accident, rather than who caused
injury to a specific person.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Tuz amounts to imposi-
tion of a mandatory cross-claim rule on codefendants in negligence ac-
tions. Florida has a permissive cross-claim rule; the pleading of a cross-
claim is never mandatory." Tuz, acting within his rights under the
present rules, chose in Burmeister to remain in a nonadversary position
with Chadbourne. Faced with a similar situation in Kimmel v. Yankee
Lines,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
stated:
Plaintiff, acting within her rights, chose to remain in a non-adversary
position with her co-defendant in the first suit. To preclude her
now from litigating her cause of action would in effect superimpose
a mandatory cross-claim rule on Pennsylvania practice. 55
One commentator has questioned the Kimmel logic. He points out
that a mandatory cross-claim rule would prevent all codefendants from
later asserting a claim against their coparties. 56 Application of collateral
estoppel, however, only prevents relitigation by those codefendants who
fail to prevail in the initial suit. The Tuz opinion, for instance, would
not prevent Chadbourne from suing Tuz for damage to the road
grader. Indeed, estoppel by judgment would aid Chadbourne in such
a suit.
The difficulty with the above analysis is that it is based on hind-
sight. At the outset of a suit, codefendants have no way of knowing
whether the plaintiff will prevail or whether some codefendants will
be exonerated. Since the initial action may foreclose later litigation of
a codefendant's negligence, codefendants will be forced into adversary
positions. While individual codefendants might make tactical decisions
not to file formal cross-claims, 57 the behavior of codefendants after
Tuz will be virtually identical to behavior of codefendants faced with
a mandatory cross-claim rule. Though Tuz may rest on a determination
that the parties chose to become adversaries in fact,58 the broad language
of Tuz withdraws that choice from future codefendants. Like a manda-
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g).
54. 224 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1955), aff'g 125 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
55. Id. at 646.
56. Vestal, supra note 28, at 32.
57. A codefendant might choose not to file a cross-claim, for instance, because he
wished to bifurcate determinations of liability and of damages.
58. See page 665 supra.
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tory cross-claim rule, the Tuz decision gives codefendants overpowering
incentive to become adversaries in the initial suit.
T. ELAINE HOLMES
